s of a capable judge were ability, and the fear of God,
truthfulness and hatred of unjust gain.

We learn from Deuteronomy (i. 9-15), that Moses allowed the people
themselves to elect these officials, who became not only their judges
but their captains.

From the whole of this narrative we see clearly that the intervention of
God for Israel is no more to be regarded as superseding the exercise of
human prudence and common-sense, than as dispensing with valour in the
repulse of Amalek, and with patience in journeying through the
wilderness.

THE TYPICAL BEARINGS OF THE HISTORY.

We are now about to pass from history to legislation. And this is a
convenient stage at which to pause, and ask how it comes to pass that
all this narrative is also, in some sense, an allegory. It is a
discussion full of pitfalls. Countless volumes of arbitrary and fanciful
interpretation have done their worst to discredit every attempt, however
cautious and sober, at finding more than the primary signification in
any narrative.[32] And whoever considers the reckless, violent and
inconsistent methods of the mystical commentators may be forgiven if he
recoils from occupying the ground which they have wasted, and contents
himself with simply drawing the lessons which the story directly
suggests.

But the New Testament does not warrant such a surrender. It tells us
that leaven answers to malice, and unleavened bread to sincerity; that
at the Red Sea the people were baptized; that the tabernacle and the
altar, the sacrifice and the priest, the mercy-seat and the manna, were
all types and shadows of abiding Christian realities.

It is more surprising to find the return of the infant Jesus connected
with the words "When Israel was a child then I loved him, and I called
My son out of Egypt,"--for it is impossible to doubt that the prophet
was here speaking of the Exodus, and had in mind the phrase "Israel is
My son, My firstborn: let My son go, that he may serve Me" (Matt. i. 15;
Hos. xi. 1; Exod. iv. 22).

How are such passages to be explained? Surely not by finding a
superficial resemblance between two things, and thereupon transferring
to one of them whatever is true of the other. No thought can attain
accuracy except by taking care not to confuse in this way things which
superficially resemble each other.

But no thought can be fertilising and suggestive which neglects real and
deep resemblances, resemblances of principle as well as in