hysical powers at all.
The property qualification for suffrage is, to my mind, an
invasion of natural right, which elevates mere property to an
equality with life and personal liberty, and it ought never to be
imposed. But, however that may be, its application has no
relation to sex, and its only object is to secure the exercise of
the suffrage under a stronger sense of obligation and
responsibility. The same is true of the qualifications of sanity,
education and obedience to the laws, which exclude dementia,
ignorance and crime from participation in the sovereignty. Every
condition or qualification imposed upon the exercise of the
suffrage, save sex alone, has for its only object or possible
justification the possession of mental and moral fitness, and has
no relation to physical power.
The question then arises why is the qualification of masculinity
required? The distinction between human beings by reason of sex
is a physical distinction. The soul is of no sex. If there be a
distinction of soul by reason of the physical difference, woman
is the superior of man. In proof of this see the minority report
of this committee with all the eulogiums of woman pronounced by
those who, like the serpent of old, would flatter her vanity that
they may continue to wield her power. I repeat that the soul is
of no sex, and that so far as the possession and exercise of
human rights and powers are concerned, sex is but a physical
property, whose possession renders the female just as important
as the male, and in just as great need of power in the government
of society. If there be a difference, however, her average
physical inferiority is really compensated for by a superior
mental and moral fitness to give direction to the course of
society and to the policy of the State. If, then, there be a
distinction between the souls of human beings resulting from sex,
woman is better fitted for the exercise of the suffrage than man.
It is asserted by some that the suffrage is an inherent natural
right, and by others that it is merely a privilege extended to
the individual by society at its discretion. However this may be,
its extension to any class must come through the exercise of the
suffrage by those who already possess it. Therefore, the appeal
by those w
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