to him,
that Smellie meant blindfolded, instead of blinded; a handkerchief was
then tied round the boy's head, so as to hinder him from seeing, and
he was made perfectly to understand the meaning of the word
_blindfolded_.

In such trifles as these, it may appear of little consequence to
rectify the verbal errours of children; but exactly the same species
of mistake, will prevent them from reasoning accurately in matters of
consequence. It will not cost us much more trouble to detect these
mistakes when the causes of them are yet recent; but it will give us
infinite trouble to retrace thoughts which have passed in infancy.
When prejudices, or the habits of reasoning inaccurately, have been
formed, we cannot easily discover or remedy the remote trifling origin
of the evil.

When children begin to inquire about causes, they are not able to
distinguish between coincidence and causation: we formerly observed
the effect which this ignorance produces upon their temper; we must
now observe its effect upon their understanding. A little reflection
upon our own minds, will prevent us from feeling that stupid
amazement, or from expressing that insulting contempt which the
natural thoughts of children sometimes excite in persons who have
frequently less understanding than their pupils. What account can we
give of the connection between cause and effect? How is the idea, that
one thing is the cause of another, first produced in our minds? All
that we know is, that amongst human events, those which precede, are,
in some cases, supposed to produce what follow. When we have observed,
in several instances, that one event constantly precedes another, we
believe, and expect, that these events will in future recur together.
Before children have had experience, it is scarcely possible that they
should distinguish between fortuitous circumstances and causation;
accidental coincidences of time, and juxta-position, continually lead
them into errour. We should not accuse children of reasoning ill; we
should not imagine that they are defective in judgment, when they make
mistakes from deficient experience; we should only endeavour to make
them delay to decide until they have repeated their experiments; and,
at all events, we should encourage them to lay open their minds to us,
that we may assist them by our superior knowledge.

This spring, little W---- (three years old) was looking at a man who
was mowing the grass before the door. It had