had not yet arrived. The Athenians
gathered together all the forces at their command on the northern side
of the city, and were debating the question, with great anxiety and
earnestness, whether they should shut themselves up within the walls,
and await the onset of their enemies there, or go forth to meet them
on the way. The whole force which the Greeks could muster consisted
of but about ten thousand men, while the Persian host contained over a
hundred thousand. It seemed madness to engage in a contest on an open
field against such an overwhelming disparity of numbers. A majority of
voices were, accordingly, in favor of remaining within the
fortifications of the city, and awaiting an attack.

The command of the army had been intrusted, not to one man, but to a
commission of three generals, a sort of triumvirate, on whose joint
action the decision of such a question devolved. Two of the three were
in favor of taking a defensive position; but the third, the celebrated
Miltiades, was so earnest and so decided in favor of attacking the
enemy themselves, instead of waiting to be attacked, that his opinion
finally carried the day, and the other generals resigned their portion
of authority into his hands, consenting that he should lead the Greek
army into battle, if he dared to take the responsibility of doing so.

The two armies were at this time encamped in sight of each other on
the plain of Marathon, between the mountain and the sea. They were
nearly a mile apart. The countless multitude of the Persians extended
as far as the eye could reach, with long lines of tents in the
distance, and thousands of horsemen on the plain, all ready for the
charge. The Greeks, on the other hand, occupied a small and isolated
spot, in a compact form, without cavalry, without archers, without, in
fact, any weapons suitable either for attack or defense, except in a
close encounter hand to hand. Their only hope of success depended on
the desperate violence of the onset they were to make upon the vast
masses of men spread out before them. On the one side were immense
numbers, whose force, vast as it was, must necessarily be more or less
impeded in its operations, and slow. It was to be overpowered,
therefore, if overpowered at all, by the utmost fierceness and
rapidity of action--by sudden onsets, unexpected and furious assaults,
and heavy, vigorous, and rapid blows. Miltiades, therefore, made all
his arrangements with reference to that mod