minor actions involving small bodies of
trained and organized troops on both sides.
The tactics employed are in general those prescribed for the smaller
units. (596)
=607. Irregular operations.= Irregular operations consist of actions
against unorganized or partially organized forces, acting independent
or semi independent bodies. Such bodies have little or only crude
training and are under nominal and loose leadership and control. They
assemble, roam about, and disperse at will. They endeavor to win by
stealth or by force of superior numbers, employing ambuscades, sudden
dashes or rushes, and hand-to-hand fighting. (597)
Troops operating against such an enemy usually do so in small units,
such as platoons, detachments, or companies, and the tactics employed
must be adapted to meet the requirements of the situation. Frequently
the enemy's own methods may be employed to advantage.
In general, such operations should not be undertaken hastily; every
preparation should be made to strike suddenly and to inflict the
maximum punishment.
=608. March and bivouac formations to admit of rapid action in any
direction.= In general, the service of information will be
insufficient; adequate reconnaissance will rarely be practicable.
March and bivouac formations must be such as to admit of rapid
deployment and fire action in any direction. (598)
=609. Formation in open country.= In the open country, where surprise
is not probable, troops may be marched in column of squads preceded,
within sight, by a squad as an advance party. (599)
=610. Formation in close country.= In close country, where surprise is
possible, the troops must be held in a close formation. The use of
flank patrols becomes difficult. Occasionally, an advance party--never
less than a squad--may be sent out. In general, however, such a party
accomplishes little, since an enemy intent on surprise will permit it
to pass unmolested and will fall upon the main body.
Under such conditions, especially when the road or trail is narrow,
the column of twos or files is a convenient formation, the officers
placing themselves in the column so as to divide it into nearly equal
parts. If rushed from a flank, such a column will be in readiness to
face and fire toward either or both flanks, the ranks being back to
back; if rushed from the front, the head of the column may be
deployed, the rest of the column closing up to support it and to
protect its flanks and rear. I
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