irst firing position the attack seeks to gain fire superiority.
This may necessitate a steady, accurate fire a long time. The object
is to subdue the enemy's fire and keep it subdued so that the
attacking troops may advance from this point to a favorable place near
the enemy from which the charge may be made. Hence, in the advance by
rushes, sufficient rifles must be kept constantly in action to keep
down the enemy's fire; this determines the size of the fraction
rushing. (458)

=473. Futility of advancing without fire superiority.= To advance
without fire superiority against a determined defense would result in
such losses as to bring the attack to a standstill or to make the
apparent success barren of results. (459)

=474. Signs that fire superiority has been gained.= Diminution of the
enemy's fire and a pronounced loss in effectiveness are the surest
signs that fire superiority has been gained and that a part of the
firing line can advance. (460)

=475. Retiring under fire in daylight suicidal; intrenching.= The men
must be impressed with the fact that, having made a considerable
advance under fire and having been checked, it is suicidal to turn
back in daylight.

If they can advance no farther, they must intrench and hold on until
the fall of darkness or a favorable turn in the situation develops.

Intrenching is resorted to only when necessary. Troops who have
intrenched themselves under fire are moved forward again with
difficulty. (461)

=476. Supports and reserves occupying trenches vacated by firing line,
to improve same.= Supports and reserves occupying intrenchments
vacated by the firing line should improve them, but they must not be
held back or diverted from their true missions on this account. (462)

=477. Greater detail of conduct of fire attack.= Paragraphs 346 to
354, inclusive, deal more in detail with the conduct of the fire
attack. (463)

THE CHARGE

(See pars. 355-356)

=478. What fire superiority accomplishes; psychological moment for
charge determined by tactical instinct.= Fire superiority beats down
the enemy's fire, destroys his resistance and morale, and enables the
attacking troops to close on him, but an actual or threatened
occupation of his position is needed to drive him out and defeat him.

The psychological moment for the charge can not be determined far in
advance. The tactical instinct of the responsible officer must decide.
(464)

=479. When, and distance over whic