gree, is just and
necessary. I had frequently pressed on the members individually, while
in Congress, the doing this by a resolution of Congress for appointing
an executive committee, to act during the sessions of Congress, as
the committee of the States was to act during their vacations. But the
referring to this committee all executive business, as it should present
itself, would require a more persevering self-denial than I suppose
Congress to possess. It will be much better to make that separation by
a federal act. The negative proposed to be given them on all the acts
of the several legislatures, is now, for the first time, suggested to
my mind. _Prima facie_, I do not like it. It fails in an essential
character; that the hole and the patch should be commensurate. But this
proposes to mend a small hole, by covering the whole garment. Not more
than one out of one hundred State acts, concern the confederacy. This
proposition, then, in order to give them one degree of power, which
they ought to have, gives them ninety-nine more, which they ought not
to have, upon a presumption that they will not exercise the ninety-nine.
But upon every act there will be a preliminary question, Does this act
concern the confederacy? And was there ever a proposition so plain, as
to pass Congress without a debate? Their decisions are almost always
wise; they are like pure metal. But you know of how much dross this is
the result. Would not an appeal from the State judicature to a federal
court, in all cases where the act of Confederation controlled the
question, be as effectual a remedy, and exactly commensurate to the
defect. A British creditor, for example, sues for his debt in Virginia;
the defendant pleads an act of the State, excluding him from their
courts; the plaintiff urges the confederation, and the treaty made under
that, as controlling the State law; the judges are weak enough to decide
according to the views of their legislature. An appeal to a federal
court gets all to rights. It will be said, that this court may encroach
on the jurisdiction of the State courts. It may. But there will be a
power, to wit, Congress, to watch and restrain them. But place the same
authority in Congress itself, and there will be no power above them
to perform the same office. They will restrain within due bounds a
jurisdiction exercised by others, much more rigorously than if exercised
by themselves.

I am uneasy at seeing that the sale of our we