al, that General Amherst was marching to invade Canada with a
very considerable army by the rapids and Lake Ontario, whilst General
Murray had orders to come up the river with his army from Quebec, and
join Gen. Amherst at Montreal. But they had no knowledge of a third
body of troops, about four thousand men, that came by Lake Champlain,
in the month of July, five weeks before the arrival of the other two
armies at Montreal, and besieged Isle aux Noix with a very
considerable train of artillery, cannon, mortars, &c., in profusion.

They erected five batteries of guns on the south side of the river,
with a bomb battery, which rendered our trenches useless, as they had
a sight of us everywhere, back, face and sideways, and so near us that
at the south staccado they killed several of our soldiers by their
musket shots.

The sandy ground protected us from the effect of their shells, which
they threw upon us in great numbers, with a continual fire from their
gun batteries.

After sixteen days' siege with a most violent cannonade, without a
moment's interruption, M. Nogaire, an officer in the Regiment of Royal
Roussillon, came to us from Montreal, having crossed directly through
the woods, with some Indians for his guides, with two letters from De
Bougainville, one of which was from him to Vaudreuil, and the other
from M. de Levis. It was a very critical conjuncture, having only two
days' provision for the garrison, which had subsisted until the
arrival of the English troops by means of fishing-nets, that river
abounding with the most delicious fish, with seven or eight oxen,
which had been kept as a reserve and killed by the enemy's cannon. M.
de Vaudreuil's letter contained a permission to M. de Bougainville to
capitulate or retire from the island if it was possible. M. de Levis'
letter was a positive order to defend that post to the last extremity.
De Bougainville, notwithstanding his genius, good sense and learning,
with personal courage, and who lacked only taste for the study of the
art of war to distinguish himself, was nevertheless put to a nonplus
how to act from the contradictory orders he received. In this dilemma
he shewed me the letters, asking at the same time my advice; and my
answer was:--"That in two days famine must oblige us to surrender to
the enemy at discretion. That the reinforcements of a thousand men at
Montreal might be of the greatest importance, and help to make a good
countenance when the Engli