t or repaired three hundred fortifications. His anticipations of the
usefulness of engineer troops were fully realized, and they have ever
since received the most careful attention, and now form, as has just
been shown, one of the most important and efficient arms in the French
service. The fortifications constructed by the engineers, as organized
by Vauban, have ever since constituted one of the principal elements of
the French military power.

In the wars of Napoleon there are innumerable instances in illustration
of the delays and disasters attending the operations of armies not
supplied with engineer troops; and, on the other hand, the advantages
resulting from their services when properly organized and instructed. We
have already pointed out the influence which the fortifications in the
hands of the French exerted on the results of these wars, and the fatal
consequences to the Allies of neglecting these works of national
defence. Every student of military history will immediately call to mind
the influence of Savona, Coni, Mondovi, Ceva, Govi, Alessandria,
Tortona, Pizzighitone, Peschiera, Mantua, Palma-Nuova, Osopo,
Klagenfurth, &c., in the campaigns of 1796-7; of Genoa, Port Bard, the
fortifications of the Var, Ulm, Ingoldstadt, &c., in 1800; of Milan,
Turin, Mantua, Roco d'Aufo, Genoa, Alessandria, &c., in 1805; the
importance of Kehl, Cassel, Wesel, &c., to the French in 1806, and the
fatal consequences to the Prussians in that campaign, of their total
and culpable neglect of their own fortifications.

All military historians speak of the influence of fortifications in the
Peninsular campaigns: those which had been given up to Napoleon previous
to the opening of hostilities, contributed very much to the success of
his arms, while those which were retained by Spain and her allies,
contributed in an equal degree to hamper and embarrass his operations.
Some of these, like Saragossa and Tarragona, with their broken walls and
defective armaments, kept the enemy in check some sixty days each, and
did much to weaken the French power in the Peninsula.

Temporary or field-fortifications also had an important influence here.
The lines of Torres-Vedras, the field-works of Ronda, the intrenched
camps of the Pyrenees, Bayonne, Toulouse, &c., are examples under this
head. In fact, field-works played a most important part in all of
Napoleon's wars. We might mention the redoubt of Montenotte, the
intrenchments at Milesimo, t