individuals and of society to resort to these means, and to enact
these laws for self-protection. Let us extend the same course of
reasoning to the relations of different societies.

We live among nations who frequently wage unjust wars; who, disregarding
the rights of others, oppress and rob, and even murder their citizens,
in order to reach some unrighteous end. As individuals, we build fences
and walls for the protection of our grounds and our merchandise; so, as
a nation, we build ships and forts to protect our commerce, our harbors,
and our cities. But the walls of our houses and stores are useless,
unless made so strong and high that the robber cannot break through or
scale them without great effort and personal danger; so our national
ships and forts would be utterly useless for protection, unless fully
armed and equipped.

Further: as individuals and as societies we employ civil officers for
the protection of our property and lives, and, when necessary, arm them
with the physical means of executing the laws, even though the
employment of these means should cost human life. The prevention and
punishment of crime causes much human suffering; nevertheless the good
of community requires that crime should be prevented and punished. So,
as a nation, we employ military officers to man our ships and forts, to
protect our property and our persons, and to repel and punish those who
seek to rob us of our life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. National
aggressions are far more terrible in their results than individual
crime; so also the means of prevention and punishment are far more
stupendous, and the employment of these means causes a far greater
amount of human suffering. This may be a good reason for greater
_caution_ in resorting to such means, but assuredly it is no argument
against the _moral right_ to use them.

IV. War is unjustifiable because unnecessary:

"1st. The very fact that a nation relied solely upon the justice of its
measures, and the benevolence of its conduct, would do more than any
thing else to prevent the occurrence of injury. The moral sentiment of
every community would rise in opposition to injury inflicted upon the
just the kind, and the merciful."

The moral duty of nations in this respect is the same as that of
individuals. Active benevolence and forbearance should be employed, so
far as may be proper; but there are points at which forbearance ceases
to be a virtue. If we entirely forbe