the succession to the crown,
at their pleasure,--much less that they had acquired any right, in the
case of such an event as caused the Revolution, to set up any new form
of government. The author of the Reflections, I believe, thought that no
man of common understanding could oppose to this doctrine the ordinary
sovereign power as declared in the act of Queen Anne: that is, that the
kings or queens of the realm, with the consent of Parliament, are
competent to regulate and to settle the succession of the crown. This
power is and ever was inherent in the supreme sovereignty, and was not,
as the political divines vainly talk, acquired by the Revolution. It is
declared in the old statute of Queen Elizabeth. Such a power must reside
in the complete sovereignty of every kingdom; and it is in fact
exercised in all of them. But this right of _competence_ in the
legislature, not in the people, is by the legislature itself to be
exercised with _sound discretion_: that is to say, it is to be exercised
or not, in conformity to the fundamental principles of this government,
to the rules of moral obligation, and to the faith of pacts, either
contained in the nature of the transaction or entered into by the body
corporate of the kingdom,--which body in juridical construction never
dies, and in fact never loses its members at once by death.

Whether this doctrine is reconcilable to the modern philosophy of
government I believe the author neither knows nor cares, as he has
little respect for any of that sort of philosophy. This may be because
his capacity and knowledge do not reach to it. If such be the case, he
cannot be blamed, if he acts on the sense of that incapacity; he cannot
be blamed, if, in the most arduous and critical questions which can
possibly arise, and which affect to the quick the vital parts of our
Constitution, he takes the side which leans most to safety and
settlement; that he is resolved not "to be wise beyond what is written"
in the legislative record and practice; that, when doubts arise on them,
he endeavors to interpret one statute by another, and to reconcile them
all to established, recognized morals, and to the general, ancient,
known policy of the laws of England. Two things are equally evident: the
first is, that the legislature possesses the power of regulating the
succession of the crown; the second, that in the exercise of that right
it has uniformly acted as if under the _restraints_ which the autho