British right. Wellington, when
informed of this by one of his staff, was seated on the ground eating
some cold beef; suddenly starting up, he exclaimed, "Marmont's good
genius has forsaken him." He immediately attacked the French where they
had weakened their line, and overthrew them from left to right. The loss
of the enemy was severe, and Marmont himself lost an arm in the battle.

On the 12th of August following, Lord Wellington entered Madrid, and was
appointed generalissimo of the Spanish armies--a troublesome honour
which there was some difficulty in inducing him to accept. He was
created a marquis at home, thanks were voted to him for the battle of
Salamanca, and he received a grant of 100,000 l. to purchase land. He
was also in December of the same year made Duque da Vittoria in
Portugal.

In the meantime, the enormous force which had been brought together by
the French, the refusal of the Spanish generals to co-operate, the
failure of an attempt to capture the fortress of Burgos, and other
causes, compelled the allies to retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo, with the
determination of returning to Spain at a more fitting time. This retreat
was conducted in the most admirable manner, and closed the campaign of
1812.

The foregoing is necessarily a most meagre outline of events, on which
volumes have been written. Those who may be anxious to read the Duke of
Wellington's own account of the military operations, will find in the
public despatches his annual summaries: for 1809, in despatch No. 343;
for 1810, No. 504; and for 1811, No. 615. For 1812 there is no such
summary.

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the difficulties with
which the Duke of Wellington had to contend during these the three first
years of his service in Spain, were confined to the making of military
dispositions and the winning of battles. Other causes there were,
operating as a drawback at every forward step, and obstacles sufficient
to have wearied a less stout heart or a less determined spirit. To
oppose to a skillful and veteran enemy he had but an inadequate force,
most scantily supplied with provisions, and even with money. The French
generals, restrained by no principle of honour or even of policy, were
accustomed to plunder mercilessly for the subsistence of their troops:
the English commander would take nothing from the people but what was
paid for on the spot in money or in bills on the English government.
Yet, such was the a