much to lose by fighting us, as we had nothing to gain by fighting
them. Our interest in such European affairs as the independence of
Greece, Hungary and Poland was purely sentimental. Towards Europe we
were peaceful as we were peaceful towards Mars. True, our safe orators
delighted in twisting the lion's tail and upbraiding the Czar of all
the Russias. During the eighty-three years between 1815 and 1898,
however, we were never at war with a European nation.

It was not that we loved Europe too well. England we detested and
hardly a decade passed without some acrid boundary dispute. We thought
her arrogant, greedy, supercilious, and she thought us arrogant, greedy
and {36} coarse. Millions of Irish immigrants intensified this
animosity and our national vanity did the rest. But though we hated
England she was too formidable to be attacked. Therefore we bluffed
and she bluffed, and in the end we compromised.

With other countries it was still easier to keep at peace. Prussia,
Austria and the smaller German states were too distant to affect our
interests. For Russia we had a vague attachment, and except on one
occasion, she never threatened our ambitions. With France we were on
good terms except during our Civil War. We disliked Spain and despised
her, but events prevented our going to war with her.

It was because it paid that we kept at peace; any other policy would
have been wasteful, even suicidal. Our future depended upon our
ability to keep out of war. A sparse population on the edge of a vast
continent, our hope of national success lay in an isolation, which
would give us strength for future struggles. Our mission was to settle
the empty lands to the West before other nations could pre-empt them.
To embroil ourselves with strong powers was to court disaster, while
even to interest ourselves in European politics would divert our mind
from our own imperative task.

Our first American foreign policy, therefore was disentanglement. We
often speak as though America passively abstained from entering
European politics. We were, however, already a part of the unsteady
balance of power, and warring France and England sought our aid, much
as the two coalitions might seek the aid of a Bulgaria, not loving her
but needing her help. It was a bold and above all a positive policy
that Washington established when he broke the French treaty and
declared our neutrality. Though denounced as dishonourable, this