ifference and the
perfection of the resemblance, not on the nature of the thing resembled.
The simple pleasure in the imitation would be precisely of the same
degree, (if the accuracy could be equal,) whether the subject of it were
the hero or his horse. There are other collateral sources of pleasure,
which are necessarily associated with this, but that part of the
pleasure which depends on the imitation is the same in both.

Sec. 4. The pleasure resulting from imitation the most contemptible that
can be derived from art.

Ideas of imitation, then, act by producing the simple pleasure of
surprise, and that not of surprise in its higher sense and function, but
of the mean and paltry surprise which is felt in jugglery. These ideas
and pleasures are the most contemptible which can be received from art;
first, because it is necessary to their enjoyment that the mind should
reject the impression and address of the thing represented, and fix
itself only upon the reflection that it is not what it seems to be. All
high or noble emotion or thought are thus rendered physically
impossible, while the mind exults in what is very like a strictly
sensual pleasure. We may consider tears as a result of agony or of art,
whichever we please, but not of both at the same moment. If we are
surprised by them as an attainment of the one, it is impossible we can
be moved by them as a sign of the other.

Sec. 5. Imitation is only of contemptible subjects.

Ideas of imitation are contemptible in the second place, because not
only do they preclude the spectator from enjoying inherent beauty in the
subject, but they can only be received from mean and paltry subjects,
because it is impossible to imitate anything really great. We can "paint
a cat or a fiddle, so that they look as if we could take them up;" but
we cannot imitate the ocean, or the Alps. We can imitate fruit, but not
a tree; flowers, but not a pasture; cut-glass, but not the rainbow. All
pictures in which deceptive powers of imitation are displayed are
therefore either of contemptible subjects, or have the imitation shown
in contemptible parts of them, bits of dress, jewels, furniture, etc.

Sec. 6. Imitation is contemptible because it is easy.

Thirdly, these ideas are contemptible, because no ideas of power are
associated with them; to the ignorant, imitation, indeed, seems
difficult, and its success praiseworthy, but even they can by no
possibility see more in the