ON II.

OF POWER.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES RESPECTING IDEAS OF POWER.

Sec. 1. No necessity for detailed study of ideas of imitation.

We have seen in the last section, what classes of ideas may be conveyed
by art, and we have been able so far to appreciate their relative worth
as to see, that from the list, as it is to be applied to the purposes of
legitimate criticism, we may at once throw out the ideas of imitation;
first, because, as we have shown, they are unworthy the pursuit of the
artist; and secondly, because they are nothing more than the result of a
particular association of ideas of truth. In examining the truth of art,
therefore, we shall be compelled to take notice of those particular
truths, whose association gives rise to the ideas of imitation. We shall
then see more clearly the meanness of those truths, and we shall find
ourselves able to use them as tests of vice in art, saying of a
picture,--"It deceives, therefore it must be bad."

Sec. 2. Nor for separate study of ideas of power.

Ideas of power, in the same way, cannot be completely viewed as a
separate class; not because they are mean or unimportant, but because
they are almost always associated with, or dependent upon, some of the
higher ideas of truth, beauty, or relation, rendered with decision or
velocity. That power which delights us in the chalk sketch of a great
painter is not one of the fingers, not like that of the writing-master,
mere dexterity of hand. It is the accuracy and certainty of the
knowledge, rendered evident by its rapid and fearless expression, which
is the real source of pleasure; and so upon each difficulty of art,
whether it be to know, or to relate, or to invent, the sensation of
power is attendant, when we see that difficulty totally and swiftly
vanquished. Hence, as we determine what is otherwise desirable in art,
we shall gradually develop the sources of the ideas of power; and if
there be anything difficult which is not otherwise desirable, it must be
afterwards considered separately.

Sec. 3. Except under one particular form.

But it will be necessary at present to notice a particular form of the
ideas of power, which is partially independent of knowledge of truth, or
difficulty, and which is apt to corrupt the judgment of the critic, and
debase the work of the artist. It is evident that the conception of