re
leading to his assistance some of the lighter vessels of his own
command. After the naval action at Port Hudson, Banks had temporarily
abandoned his designs upon that post in favor of operations west of the
Mississippi by the Bayous Teche and Atchafalaya, the latter of which
communicates with the Red River a few miles above its mouth. This
movement was accompanied by a force of four gunboats, under the command
of Lieutenant-Commander A. P. Cooke, of the Estrella, which captured a
post on the Atchafalaya called Butte a la Rose, on the 20th of April,
the same day that Opelousas, sixty miles from Alexandria, was entered by
the army. The latter pressed on toward Alexandria, while the gunboats
pushed their way up the Atchafalaya. On the first of May two of them,
the Estrella and Arizona, passed into the Red River, and soon afterward
joined the Hartford.

Three days later Admiral Porter arrived with several of his fleet and
communicated with Farragut. The next day, May 5th, Porter went up the
Red River and pushed rapidly toward Alexandria, which was evacuated, its
stores being removed to Shreveport, three hundred and fifty miles
farther up.

Farragut now felt that his personal presence above Port Hudson was no
longer necessary. The Mississippi was ultimately to become the command
of Porter, whose vessels were especially fitted for its waters; and that
admiral was now at liberty to give his full attention below Vicksburg.
On the other hand, his own squadron in the lower river and on the
blockade demanded a closer attention than he could give from his
isolated station. Accordingly, on the 6th of May he transferred the
command to Commodore Palmer, of the Hartford, with whom he left the
Albatross, Estrella, and Arizona to intercept communications between the
two banks of the Mississippi below Red River; while he himself returned
by one of the bayous to New Orleans, reaching there on the 11th.

Thus ended Farragut's brilliant strategic movement against the
communications of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and through them against
the intercourse of the Confederacy with its great Western storehouse,
over which the two fortresses stood guard. It was a movement which,
though crippled from the beginning by a serious disaster on the
battle-field, was conceived in accordance with the soundest principles
of the art of war. Its significance has been obscured and lost in the
great enterprise initiated a month later by General Grant, and s