permission to attack
after New Orleans fell. The enterprise then was by no means as difficult
as the passage of the Mississippi forts just effected; and once
captured, the holding of the harbor would require only the small number
of troops necessary to garrison the powerful masonry fort which
commanded the main ship channel, supported by a naval force much less
numerous than that required to blockade outside. The undertaking was
therefore not open to the objection of unduly exposing the troops and
ships placed in unfortified or poorly fortified harbors, which received
such a sad illustration at Galveston; but it was dropped, owing, first,
to the preoccupation of the Government with its expectations of
immediately reducing the Mississippi, and afterward to the fear of
losing ships which at that time could not be replaced. Hesitation to
risk their ships and to take decisive action when seasonable opportunity
offers, is the penalty paid by nations which practise undue economy in
their preparations for war. When at last it became urgent to capture
Mobile before the powerful ironclad then building was completed, the
preparations of the defense were so far advanced that ironclad vessels
were needed for the attack; and before these could be, or at least
before they were, supplied, the Tennessee, which by rapid action might
have been forestalled like the similar vessel at New Orleans, was ready
for battle. Had she been used with greater wisdom by those who directed
her movements, she might have added very seriously to the embarrassment
of the United States admiral.

When Farragut, after an absence of nearly six months, returned to his
station in January, 1864, it was with the expectation of a speedy attack
upon Mobile. On his way to New Orleans he stopped off the bar, and on
the 20th of January made a reconnaissance with a couple of gunboats,
approaching to a little more than three miles from the forts commanding
the entrance. He then reported to the department that he was satisfied
that, if he had one ironclad, he could destroy the whole of the enemy's
force in the bay, and then reduce the forts at leisure with the
co-operation of about five thousand troops. "But without ironclads," he
added, "we should not be able to fight the enemy's vessels of that class
with much prospect of success, as the latter would lie on the flats,
where our ships could not get at them. By reference to the chart you
will see how small a space there