nstance, with strangely
misrepresenting the opinions of his predecessors.[433] Aristotle is
evidently wanting in that impartiality which ought to characterize the
historian of philosophy, and, sometimes, we are compelled to question
his integrity. Indeed, throughout his "Metaphysics" he exhibits the
egotism and vanity of one who imagines that he alone, of all men, has
the full vision of the truth. In Books I. and XII. he uniformly
associates the "_numbers_" of Pythagoras with the "_forms_" and
"_ideas_" of Plato. He asserts that Plato identifies "forms" and
"numbers," and regards them as real entities--substances, and causes of
all other things. "_Forms are numbers_[434]... so Plato affirmed,
similar with the Pythagoreans; and the dogma that numbers are causes to
other things--of their substance-_he, in like manner, asserted with
them_."[435] And then, finally, he employs the _same_ arguments in
refuting the doctrines of both.

[Footnote 433: "Aristotle uniformly speaks disparagingly of Anaxagoras"
(Lewes's "Biographical History of Philosophy"). He represents him as
employing mind (nous) simply as "a _machine_" for the production of the
world;--"when he finds himself in perplexity as to the cause of its
being necessarily an orderly system, he then drags it (mind) in by force
to his assistance" "Metaphysics," (bk. i. ch. iv.). But he is evidently
inconsistent with himself, for in "De Anima" (bk. i. ch. ii.) he tells
us that "Anaxagoras saith that mind is at once a _cause of motion_ in
the whole universe, and also of _well_ and _fit_." We may further ask,
is not the idea of fitness--of the good and the befitting--the final
cause, even according to Aristotle?

He also totally misrepresents Plato's doctrine of "Ideas." "Plato's
Ideas," he says, "are substantial existences--real beings"
("Metaphysics," bk. i. ch. ix.). Whereas, as we shall subsequently show,
"they are objects of pure conception for human reason, and they are
attributes of the Divine Reason. It is there they substantially exist."
(Cousin, "History of Philosophy," vol. i. p. 415). It is also pertinent
to inquire, what is the difference between the "formal cause" of
Aristotle and the archetypal ideas of Plato? and is not Plato's to
agathon the "final cause?" Yet Aristotle is forever congratulating
himself that he alone has properly treated the "formal" and the "final
cause!"]

[Footnote 434: This, however, was not the doctrine of Plato. He does not
say "for