iful.

Men are less careful how they offend him who makes himself loved than
him who makes himself feared; yet should a prince inspire fear in such a
fashion that, if he do not win love, he may escape hate; remembering
that men will sooner forget the slaying of their father than the loss of
their patrimony.

Princes who set little store by their word, but have known how to
overreach men by their cunning, have accomplished great things, and in
the end got the better of those who trusted to honest dealing. The
prince must be a lion, but he must also know how to play the fox. He
who wishes to deceive will never fail to find willing dupes. The prince,
in short, ought not to quit good courses if he can help it, but should
know how to follow evil courses if he must.

A prince must avoid being despised as well as being hated; therefore
courage, wisdom, and strength must be apparent in all his actions.
Against such a one conspiracy is difficult. That prince is wise who
devolves on others those matters that entail responsibility, and may
therefore make him odious either to the nobles or to the commons, but
reserves to himself the matters that relate to grace and favour.

What I have said is not contradicted by the history of the Roman
emperors; for they had to choose between satisfying the soldiers and
satisfying the people. It was imperative that at any cost they should
maintain control of the soldiery, which scarce any of them could do
without injustice to the people. If we examine their histories in detail
we shall find that they fully bear out the principles I have laid down.

But in our time the standing armies of princes have not the same power
as the armies of the Roman empire, and except under the Turk and the
Soldan it is more needful to satisfy the people than the soldiery.

_IV.--Of Artifices_

A new prince will never disarm his subjects, but will rather arm them,
at least in part. For thus they become his partisans, whereas without
them he must depend on mercenaries.

But a prince who adds a new state to his old possessions should disarm
its inhabitants, relying on the soldiers of his own ancient dominions.
Some have fostered feuds among their new subjects in order to keep them
weak, but such a policy rarely proves useful in the end. The prince who
acquires a new state will gain more strength by winning over and
trusting those who were at first opposed to him than by relying on those
who were at first his