ions. The causes of intentions are
motives. The social motives may be called tutelary, as tending to
restrain from mischievous intentions; but any motive may become tutelary
on occasion. Love of ease, and desire of self-preservation, in the form
of fear of punishment, are apt to be tutelary motives.

Now we can see that the strength of a temptation equals the sum of the
impelling motives, minus the sum of the tutelary motives. Hence, the
more susceptible a man is to the standing tutelary motives, the less
likely is he to yield to temptation; in other words, the less depraved
is his disposition. Hence, given the strength of the temptation, the
mischievousness of the disposition is as the apparent mischievousness of
the act. Given the apparent mischievousness of the act, the less the
temptation yielded to, the greater the depravity of disposition; but the
stronger the temptation, the less conclusive is the evidence of
depravity. It follows that the penalty should be increased--_i.e._, the
fear of punishment should be artificially intensified, in proportion as,
apart from that fear, the temptation is stronger.

We now come to consequences. The mischief of the act is the sum of its
mischievous consequences, primary and secondary. The primary mischief
subdivides into original, _i.e._, to the sufferer in the first instance;
and derivative, to the definite persons who suffer as a direct
consequence, whether through their interest, or merely through sympathy.

The secondary mischiefs, affecting not specific persons but the
community, are actual danger, or alarm--the apprehension of pain. For
the occurrence of the act points to the possibility of its repetition;
weakening the influence both of the political and of the moral sanction.
An act of which the primary consequences are mischievous may have
secondary beneficial consequences, which altogether outweigh the primary
mischief--_e.g._, the legal punishment of crime. The circumstances
influencing the secondary mischiefs of alarm and danger are the
intentionality, the consciousness, the motive, and the disposition;
danger depending on the real, and alarm on the apparent, state of mind,
though the real and the apparent coincide more commonly than not.

Between the completely intentional and completely unintentional act
there are various stages, depending on the degree of consciousness, as
explained above. The excellence of the motive does not obliterate the
mischievousness of