t angle to defend, but
was partially sheltered by a ridge on the west. His position was
in truth the key-point of the first day's battle. It overlooked
the field, and its possession by the enemy would cut our force in
two, enfilade Morrow's and Biddle's brigades, and compel a hasty
retreat.

After Hall's battery was driven back, no other artillery occupied
the ground for some time, then General Wadsworth borrowed Calef's
regular battery from the cavalry, and posted it in rear of the
position Hall had occupied. When the remainder of the division
came up, Captain Reynolds' Battery "L" of the 1st New York Artillery,
as already stated, was sent to assist Calef in keeping down the
fire of two rebel batteries on the ridge to the west; but when
Ewell's artillery also opened, the cross fire became too severe.
Calef was withdrawn, and Reynolds was severely wounded. The rebel
batteries soon after ceased firing for the time being; and at
Wadsworth's request, Colonel Wainwright, Chief of Artillery to the
First Corps, posted a section of Reynolds' battery, under Lieutenant
Wilbur, on Seminary Ridge, south of the railroad cut; Stewart's
Battery "B" 4th United States being on a line north of the cut.
Cooper's battery was directed to meet Ewell's attack from the north,
and Stevens' 5th Maine battery was retained behind the Seminary in
reserve.

Barlow's division on the right and Schimmelpfennig's on the left,
formed somewhat hastily against Ewell, whose line of battle faced
south. Barlow rested his right on a wooded knoll, constituting
part of the western bank of Rock Creek. As there was an open
country to the east he considered that flank secure, for no enemy
was in sight then, and if they came from that direction, there
would be time to make fresh dispositions. After the formation
there was an interval of a quarter of a mile between their left
and the First Corps, which might have been avoided by placing the
two divisions further apart. This was a serious thing to me, for
the attempt to fill this interval and prevent the enemy from
penetrating there, lengthened and weakened my line, and used up my
reserves. It seems to me that the Eleventh Corps was too far out.
It would have been better, in my opinion, if the left had been
_echeloned_ in rear of the right of the First Corps, and its right
had rested on the strong brick buildings with stone foundations at
the Almshouse. The enemy then could not have turned the right
wi