ugitives, we all expected that Wellington's command at
Waterloo, of _"Up, guards, and at them!"_ would be repeated, and
that a grand counter-charge would be made. But General Meade had
made no arrangements to give a return thrust. It seems to me he
should have posted the Sixth and part of the Twelfth Corps in rear
of Gibbon's division the moment Pickett's infantry were seen emerging
from the woods, a mile and a half off. If they broke through our
centre these corps would have been there to receive them, and if
they failed to pierce our line and retreated, the two corps could
have followed them up promptly before they had time to rally and
reorganize. An advance by Sykes would have kept Longstreet in
position. In all probability we would have cut the enemy's army
in two, and captured the long line of batteries opposite us, which
were but slightly guarded. Hancock, lying wounded in an ambulance,
wrote to Meade, recommending that this be done. Meade, it is true,
recognized in some sort the good effects of a counter-blow; but to
be effective the movement should have been prepared beforehand.
It was too late to commence making preparations for an advance when
some time had elapsed and when Lee had rallied his troops and had
made all his arrangements to resist an assault. It was ascertained
afterward that he had twenty rounds of ammunition left per gun,
but it was not evenly distributed and some batteries in front had
fired away all their cartridges. A counter-charge under such
circumstances is considered almost imperative in war; for the beaten
army, running and dismayed, cannot, in the nature of things, resist
with much spirit; whereas the pursuers, highly elated by their
success, and with the prospect of ending the contest, fight with
more energy and bravery. Rodes says the Union forces were so long
in occupying the town and in coming forward after the repulse of
the enemy that it was generally thought they had retreated. Meade
rode leisurely over to the Fifth Corps on the left, and told Sykes
to send out and see if the enemy in his front was firm and holding
on to their position. A brigade preceded by skirmishers was
accordingly sent forward, but as Longstreet's troops were well
fortified, they resisted the advance, and Meade--finding some hours
had elapsed and that Lee had closed up his lines and was fortifying
against him--gave up all idea of a counter-attack.

CHAPTER VII.
GENERAL RETREAT OF THE ENEMY