between Westminster and
Littlestown, but having ascertained that Kilpatrick was waiting
for him at the latter place, attempted to avoid the encounter by
going through cross roads to Hanover. He found Farnsworth's brigade
of cavalry there, however, and charged their rear, driving them
back and capturing some prisoners and ambulances. The 5th New York
made a counter-charge under Major Hammond and drove him out again.
He claims to have taken the town by the aid of Hampton's brigade,
which arrived in time to reinforce him. Custer's brigade then came
up from Abbotstown. The battle lasted until night, when Stuart
gave up the contest and retreated, leaving Kilpatrick in possession.

Part of his cavalry also attacked the 5th and 6th Michigan regiments
at Littlestown, but were repulsed. He then, having no time to
spare, kept on his way toward York to find the army he had lost.
He passed within seven miles of Ewell's column on its way to
Gettysburg, and neither knew that the other was near. Had they
effected a junction it would have saved the rebel cavalry a long,
fruitless, and exhausting march, which kept them out of the battle
on the first day. It was one of those accidental circumstances
which seemed to favor us in this campaign, while almost every
incident at Chancellorsville was against us.

Finding Ewell had left York, Stuart turned and marched on Carlisle,
which he found occupied by our troops. He demanded the surrender
of the place under a threat of bombardment. General W. F. Smith,
one of the heroes of the Peninsula, was not to be affected by
menaces; and Stuart, whose time was precious and who had no ammunition
to spare, turned off in hopes of reaching Gettysburg in time to
take part in the battle. He arrived there on the afternoon of the
2d, with horses and men worn out by their extraordinary exertions;
on their way whole regiments slept in the saddle. This force when
it reached the field found Robertson's, Jones', and Jenkins'
brigades, and White's battalion ready to join it.

By evening Meade was fully apprised, by telegrams and Buford's
scouts, that the enemy were concentrating on Gettysburg. He knew
that Reynolds at Marsh Creek was only about six miles from Hill at
Cashtown, but he sent no orders that night. He simply stated that
the enemy were marching on Gettysburg, and he would issue orders
when they developed their intentions. Thus the opposing forces
were moving in directions that would nec