. To accomplish this he directed
Stoneman to start two weeks in advance of the main body with ten
thousand cavalry, cross at the upper fords of the Rappahannock,
and sweep down upon Lee's communications with Richmond, breaking
up railroads and canals, cutting telegraph wires, and intercepting
supplies of all kinds. As the rebel commissariat found great
difficulty in keeping more than four days' rations on hand at a
time, Stoneman's raid would almost necessarily force Lee to fall
back on his depots and give up Fredericksburg. One column under
Averell was to attack Culpeper and Gordonsville, the other under
Buford to move to Louisa Court House, and thence to the Fredericksburg
Railroad. Both columns were to unite behind the Pamunkey, and in
case our army was successful Stoneman was directed to plant his
force behind some river in an advantageous position on Lee's line
of retreat, where he could detain the rebel army until Hooker could
again assail it and compel it to surrender. A brave programme!
Let us see how it was carried out.

It was an essential part of Hooker's project that the cavalry should
begin operations two weeks before the infantry. If they did their
work thoroughly, Lee would be out of provisions, and his retreat
would give us all the moral effect of a victory. The rebel cavalry
at the time being reduced to about 3,000 men, it was not supposed
that Stoneman would encounter any serious resistance. He accordingly
started on April 13th to carry out his instructions, but another
rain storm, which made the river unfordable, and very bad roads,
detained him until the 28th. It has been suggested that he might
have crossed higher up, but cavalry officers who were there, tell
me that every ravine had become an impassable river. Hooker became
impatient and refused to wait any longer; so when the water subsided,
all--infantry, artillery, and cavalry--were sent over together.
The result was that the battle was ended before Stoneman got fairly
to work, and his operations had little or no effect in obstructing
Lee's movements.

To confuse the enemy as much as possible, demonstrations had been
made at both ends of the line. On April 21st a small infantry
force was sent to threaten Kelly's Ford. On the same day, I went
with part of my division down the river to Port Conway, opposite
Port Royal, twenty miles below Fredericksburg, made a pretence of
crossing in pontoons, and built fires in every direction at n