nce more.

The enemy soon posted batteries on the high ground a mile east of
Chancellorsville, and opened on Hancock's front with considerable
effect. They also enfiladed Geary's division of Slocum's corps,
and became very annoying, but Knap's battery of the Twelfth Corps
replied effectively and kept their fire down to a great extent.

As the Union army was hidden by a thick undergrowth, Lee spent the
rest of the day in making a series of feigned attacks to ascertain
where our troops were posted.

When night set in, the sound of the axe was heard in every direction,
for both armies thought it prudent to strengthen their front as
much as possible.

The prospect for Lee as darkness closed over the scene was far from
encouraging. He had examined the position of the Union army
carefully, and had satisfied himself that as regards its centre
and left it was unassailable. Let any man with a musket on his
shoulder, encumbered with a cartridge-box, haversack, canteen,
etc., attempt to climb over a body of felled timber to get at an
enemy who is coolly shooting at him from behind a log breastwork,
and he will realize the difficulty of forcing a way through such
obstacles. Our artillery, too, swept every avenue of approach, so
that the line might be considered as almost impregnable. Before
giving up the attack, however, Stuart was directed to cautiously
reconnoitre on the right, where Howard was posted, and see if there
was not a vulnerable point there.

CHAPTER III.
THE DISASTROUS SECOND OF MAY.

At dawn of day General Lee and General Jackson were sitting by the
side of the plank road, on some empty cracker boxes, discussing
the situation, when Stuart came up and reported the result of his
reconnoissance. He said the right flank of Howard's corps was
defenceless and easily assailable. Jackson at once asked permission
to take his own corps--about 26,000 muskets--make a detour through
the woods to conceal his march from observation, and fall unexpectedly
upon the weak point referred to by Stuart. It was a startling
proposition and contrary to all the principles of strategy, for
when Jackson was gone Lee would be left with but a few men to
withstand the shock of Hooker's entire army, and might be driven
back to Fredericksburg or crushed. If the Eleventh Corps had
prepared for Jackson's approach by a line properly fortified, with
redoubts on the flanks, the men protected in front by felled timber
and sheltered