America, and the
Americans were told they must not cross it. America said, "What is
this?" Germany said, "This is our line, beyond which you must not go,"
and America said, "The place for that line is not the Atlantic, but on
the Rhine--and we mean to help you roll it up."

There are two great facts which clinch the argument that this is a
great struggle for freedom. The first is the fact that America has
come in. She would not have come in otherwise. When France in the
eighteenth century sent her soldiers to America to fight for the
freedom and independence of that land, France also was an autocracy in
those days. But Frenchmen in America, once they were there, their aim
was freedom, their atmosphere was freedom, their inspiration was
freedom. They acquired a taste for freedom, and they took it home, and
France became free. That is the story of Russia. Russia engaged in
this great war for the freedom of Serbia, of Montenegro, of Bulgaria,
and has fought for the freedom of Europe. They wanted to make their
own country free, and they have done it. The Russian revolution is not
merely the outcome of the struggle for freedom. It is a proof of the
character of the struggle for liberty, and if the Russian people
realize, as there is every evidence they are doing, that national
discipline is not incompatible with national freedom--nay, that
national discipline is essential to the security of national
freedom--they will, indeed, become a free people.

I have been asking myself the question, Why did Germany, deliberately,
in the third year of the war, provoke America to this declaration and
to this action--deliberately, resolutely? It has been suggested that
the reason was that there were certain elements in American life, and
the Hohenzollerns were under the impression that they would make it
impossible for the United States to declare war. That I can hardly
believe. But the answer has been afforded by Marshal von Hindenburg
himself, in the very remarkable interview which appeared in the press,
I think, only this morning.

He depended clearly on one of two things. First, that the submarine
campaign would have destroyed international shipping to such an extent
that England would have been put out of business before America was
ready. According to his computation, America cannot be ready for
twelve months. He does not know America. Second, that when America is
ready, at the end of twelve months, with her a