'[9] The exact manner in which he intended to use this
organisation he had explained constantly by word of mouth to his
captains, but no further record of his design has been found. Still
there is an alteration which he made in his signal book at the same
time that gives us the needed light. We cannot fail to notice the
striking resemblance between his method of attack by separate
divisions on a disordered enemy, and that made by the Elizabethan
admirals at Gravelines upon the Armada after its formation had been
broken up by the fireships. That attack was made intuitively by
divisions independently handled as occasion should dictate, and
Nelson's new signal leaves little doubt that this was the plan which
he too intended. The alteration he ordered was to change the
signification of Signal 16, so that it meant that each of his flag
officers, from the moment it was made, should have control of his own
division and make any signals he thought proper.

But this was not all. By the same general order he made two other
alterations in the signal book in view of encountering the French in
order of battle. They too are of the highest interest and run as
follows: 'To be inserted in pencil in the signal book. At
No. 182. Being to windward of the enemy, to denote I mean to attack
the enemy's line from the rear towards the van as far as thirteen
ships, or whatsoever number of the British ships of the line may be
present, that each ship may know his opponent in the enemy's line.'
No. 183. 'I mean to press hard with the whole force on the enemy's
rear.'[10]

Thus we see that at the very first opportunity Nelson had of enforcing
his own tactical ideas he enunciated three of the principles upon
which his great memorandum was based, viz. breaking up his line of
battle into three divisional lines, independent control by divisional
leaders, and concentration on the enemy's rear. All that is wanting
are the elements of surprise and containing.

These, however, we see germinating in the memorandum he issued five
years later off Toulon. In that case he expected to meet the French
fleet on an opposite course, and being mainly concerned in stopping it
and having a slightly superior force he is content to concentrate on
the van. But, in view of the strategical necessity of making the
attack in this way, he takes extra precautions which are not found in
the general order of 1798. He provides for preventing the enemy's
knowing on which side hi