s essential and what was accidental in Nelson's great
conception, and, mistaking the shadow for the substance, believed that
he had abandoned his carefully prepared project.

For those who did not entirely grasp Nelson's meaning there is much
excuse. We who are able to follow step by step the progress of
tactical thought from the dawn of the sailing period can appreciate
without much difficulty the radical revolution which he was setting on
foot. It was a revolution, as we can plainly see, that was tending to
bring the long-drawn curve of tactical development round to the point
at which the Elizabethans had started. Surprise is sometimes expressed
that, having once established the art of warfare under sail in
broadside ships, our seamen were so long in finding the tactical
system it demanded. Should not the wonder be the converse: that the
Elizabethan seamen so quickly came so near the perfected method of the
greatest master of the art? The attack at Gravelines in 1588 with four
mutually supporting squadrons in echelon bears strong elementary
resemblance to that at Trafalgar in 1805. It was in dexterity and
precision of detail far more than in principle that the difference
lay. The first and the last great victory of the British navy had
certainly more in common with each other than either had with Malaga
or the First of June. In the zenith of their careers Nelson and Drake
came very near to joining hands. Little wonder then if many of
Nelson's captains failed to fathom the full depth of his profound
idea. Naval officers in those days were left entirely without
theoretical instruction on the higher lines of their profession, and
Nelson, if we may judge by the style of his memoranda, can hardly have
been a very lucid expositor. He thought they all understood what with
pardonable pride he called the 'Nelson touch.' The most sagacious and
best educated of them probably did, but there were clearly some--and
Collingwood, as we shall see, was amongst them--who only grasped some
of the complex principles which were combined in his brilliant
conception.

An analysis of the memorandum will show how complex it was. In the
first and foremost place there is a clear note of denunciation against
the long established fallacy of the old order of battle in single
line. Secondly, there is in its stead the reestablishment of the
primitive system of mutually supporting squadrons in line
ahead. Thirdly, there is the principle of throwing