over-ruling the established
course of the general Law of Nations."

It is to the Maritime Courts, then, of this and other countries, that
the hopes of civilization must look for improvement and advance in the
canons of international intercourse during the unhappy time of war.
The manner, and the feeling in which they are to pronounce those
canons cannot be more finely enunciated than in the words of Lord
Stowell himself.

"I consider myself as stationed here, not to deliver
occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes
of particular national interest, but to administer with
indifference that justice which the _Law of Nations_ holds
out, without distinction, to independent states, some
happening to be neutral, and some belligerent.

"The seat of judicial authority is indeed locally _here_ in
the belligerent country, according to the known law and
practice of nations; _but the law itself has no locality_.
It is the duty of the person who sits here to determine this
question exactly as he would determine the same question, if
sitting at Stockholm; to assert no pretensions on the part
of Great Britain, which he would not allow to Sweden in the
same circumstances; and to impose no duties on Sweden, as a
neutral country, which he would not admit to belong to
_Great Britain_, in the same character. If, therefore, I
mistake the law in this matter, I mistake that which I
consider, and which I mean should be considered, as
UNIVERSAL LAW upon the question."

When an Admiralty Judge investigates the law in this impartial spirit,
he occupies the grand position of being in some respects the director
of the deeds of nations; but with equal certainty does the taint of an
unjust bias poison all his authority; his judgments are powerful then
only for evil; they bind no one beyond the country in which he sits,
and may become the motive and origin of reprisal and attack upon his
native land.

As the authority of the international judge depends on his integrity,
so also does the universal law arise from, and remain supported by,
the true principles of right and justice; in other words, by the
fundamental distinction between right and wrong. A statute, a despotic
prerogative, and an established principle of common law, rest upon
different sanctions. They may be the causes of the greatest injustice,
may sow the seeds of nat