dea as that of the amalgamation of the
people of the States into one consolidated mass--unless it was suggested
by Mr. Gouverneur Morris in the proposition above referred to, in which
he stood alone among the delegates of twelve sovereign States assembled
in convention.

As to the features of centralism, or nationalism, which they did
advocate, all the ability of this little minority of really gifted men
failed to secure the incorporation of any one of them into the
Constitution, or to obtain their recognition by any of the ratifying
States. On the contrary, the very men who had been the leading advocates
of such theories, on failing to secure their adoption, loyally accepted
the result, and became the ablest and most efficient supporters of the
principles which had prevailed. Thus, Mr. Hamilton, who had favored the
plan of a President and Senate, both elected to hold office for life (or
during good behavior), with a veto power in Congress on the action of
the State Legislatures, became, through the "Federalist," in conjunction
with his associates, Mr. Madison and Mr. Jay, the most distinguished
expounder and advocate of the Constitution, as then proposed and
afterward ratified, with all its Federal and State-rights features. In
the ninth number of that remarkable series of political essays, he
quotes, adopts, and applies to the then proposed Constitution,
Montesquieu's description of a "CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC," a term which he
(Hamilton) repeatedly employs.

In the eighty-first number of the same series, replying to apprehensions
expressed by some that a State might be brought before the Federal
courts to answer as defendant in suits instituted against her, he repels
the idea in these plain and conclusive terms. The italics are my own:

"It is inherent in the nature of _sovereignty_ not to be
amenable to the suit of any individual without its consent. This
is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and
the exemption, as one of the _attributes of sovereignty_, is now
enjoyed by the government of _every State in the Union_. Unless,
therefore, there is _a surrender of this immunity_ in the plan
of the Convention, _it will remain with the States_, and the
danger intimated must be merely ideal.... The contracts between
_a nation_ and individuals are only binding on the conscience of
_the sovereign_, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force.
They confer no righ