had arrived in the case of the Tsar. It
had arrived in the case of Kerensky. It has not arrived in the case
of the Soviet Government for certain obvious reasons. For one thing,
a collapse of the Soviet Government at the present time would be
disconcerting, if not disastrous, to its more respectable enemies.
It would, of course, open the way to a practically unopposed military
advance, but at the same time it would present its enemies with enormous
territory, which would overwhelm the organizing powers which they have
shown again and again to be quite inadequate to much smaller tasks. Nor
would collapse of the present Government turn a bad harvest into a
good one. Such a collapse would mean the breakdown of all existing
organizations, and would intensify the horrors of famine for every town
dweller. Consequently, though the desperation of hunger and resentment
against inevitable requisitions may breed riots and revolts here and
there throughout the country, the men who, in other circumstances, might
coordinate such events, will refrain from doing anything of the sort.
I do not say that collapse is impossible. I do say that it would be
extremely undesirable from the point of view of almost everybody
in Russia. Collapse of the present Government would mean at best a
reproduction of the circumstances of 1917, with the difference that no
intervention from without would be necessary to stimulate indiscriminate
slaughter within. I say "at best" because I think it more likely that
collapse would be followed by a period of actual chaos. Any Government
that followed the Communists would be faced by the same economic
problem, and would have to choose between imposing measures very like
those of the Communists and allowing Russia to subside into a new area
for colonization. There are people who look upon this as a natural, even
a desirable, result of the revolution. They forget that the Russians
have never been a subject race, that they have immense powers of
passive resistance, that they respond very readily to any idea that they
understand, and that the idea of revolt against foreigners is difficult
not to understand. Any country that takes advantage of the Russian
people in a moment of helplessness will find, sooner or later, first
that it has united Russia against it, and secondly that it has given all
Russians a single and undesirable view of the history of the last
three years. There will not be a Russian who will not believe t