emove therefrom was a
glorious rescue. But that it is imperfect, subject to convulsions, and
incapable of producing what it seems to promise, is easily demonstrated.

Absolute governments (tho' the disgrace of human nature) have this
advantage with them, that they are simple; if the people suffer, they
know the head from which their suffering springs, know likewise the
remedy, and are not bewildered by a variety of causes and cures. But
the constitution of England is so exceedingly complex, that the nation
may suffer for years together without being able to discover in which
part the fault lies; some will say in one and some in another, and
every political physician will advise a different medicine.

I know it is difficult to get over local or long standing prejudices,
yet if we will suffer ourselves to examine the component parts of the
English constitution, we shall find them to be the base remains of two
ancient tyrannies, compounded with some new republican materials.

FIRST - The remains of monarchial tyranny in the person of the king.
SECONDLY - The remains of aristocratical tyranny in the persons of the
peers. THIRDLY - The new republican materials in the persons of the
commons,
on whose virtue depends the freedom of England.

The two first, by being hereditary, are independent of the people;
wherefore in a CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE they contribute nothing towards the
freedom of the state.

To say that the constitution of England is a UNION of three powers
reciprocally CHECKING each other, is farcical, either the words have no
meaning, or they are flat contradictions.

To say that the commons is a check upon the king, presupposes two
things:

FIRST - That the king is not to be trusted without being looked after,
or in other words, that a thirst for absolute power is the natural
disease of monarchy.

SECONDLY - That the commons, by being appointed for that purpose, are
either wiser or more worthy of confidence than the crown.

But as the same constitution which gives the commons a power to check
the king by withholding the supplies, gives afterwards the king a power
to check the commons, by empowering him to reject their other bills; it
again supposes that the king is wiser than those whom it has already
supposed to be wiser than him. A mere absurdity!

There is something exceedingly ridiculous in the composition of
monarchy; it first excludes a man from the means of information, yet
empo