s on reconnaissance
duties. The information has now to be fought for, and it is necessary
for reconnaissances to consist of at least five machines flying in
formation.'

Fighting in the air had by 1916 become a regular incident of
reconnaissance work. But when once fighting machines were produced, it
was obvious that their use would not be restricted to attacks on enemy
aircraft. Bombing raids on enemy positions became a regular duty of the
Flying Corps. A machine built to take a heavy load of bombs is clumsy
and slow in manoeuvre, not well able to repel the attack of light
fighting scouts. To borrow a phrase from the pilots, it is cold meat in
the air. Hence bombing raids were carried out chiefly at night, and
night flying, on machines designed for the purpose, became another
special duty of the Flying Corps. These raids were what may be called
short-distance raids, aimed at the aerodromes, munition stores, and
communications of the German forces on the western front. They were
followed, later, by long-distance raids, carried out by the Independent
Air Force of 1918 against those centres in Germany which were sources of
supply for the German army. In his dispatch of January 1919, on the work
of the Independent Air Force, General Trenchard reviews and summarizes
what had been his policy from the beginning. It was necessary, he says,
to equip the British expeditionary force on the western front with
sufficient aircraft to hold and beat the German aerial forces on the
western front; the bombing of Germany was a luxury till this had been
accomplished, but once this had been accomplished, it became a
necessity.

A good general idea of the growth of the Flying Corps can be obtained
from a study of the programmes put up in 1915 to Sir John French, and in
later years to Sir Douglas Haig, by the command of the Flying Corps in
the field. These programmes are consistent and progressive; they look
ahead, and attempt to provide the Flying Corps, in good time, with the
means of meeting the demands certain to be made on it. On the 21st of
August 1915, some two or three days after he had taken over the command
in the field, Colonel Trenchard wrote to the Chief of the General Staff
at General Headquarters. In this letter he speaks of the number of
hostile aeroplanes seen on the Second Army front, and asks for another
squadron to be sent out from home by the middle of September. 'I think a
guide for the future', he says, 'should be at