t be contended that women are not included within this
provision.

The 8th section declares "that no freeman shall be imprisoned or
disseized of his freehold," etc., but by the judgment of his
peers or the law of the land. Will woman be deprived of the
guarantees in this section and the right of trial by jury because
the masculine pronoun is used? Under the 11th section no man's
property can be taken or applied to public use without the
consent, etc. Is not the property of a woman as secure under this
provision as that of a man? In the chapter upon forcible entry
and detainer, the masculine pronoun is used throughout, but no
court would hesitate for a moment in holding a woman to be within
its provisions if she should wrongfully hold possession of
premises.

In the whole Chancery Code of this State, consisting of 53
sections, the word woman, female, she, her, herself, or any other
feminine pronouns are not to be found, while in the 5th, 8th,
15th, 18th, 19th, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st,
36th, 37th, and 46th, and some others, the masculine pronouns
frequently occur. The same construction that would exclude a
woman from the provisions of the statute in regard to the
admission of attorneys, would place her without the Chancery
Code. Yet no respectable attorney would claim because defendants
in chancery are represented in the law by masculine pronouns,
that a woman could not be made a defendant in chancery.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

MYRA BRADWELL.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COURT.

No order having been entered or opinion filed in this case, on
the seventh of October the applicant received from the court,
through Hon. Norman L. Freeman, Supreme Court Reporter, the
following communication:

STATE OF ILLINOIS, SUPREME COURT, THIRD GRAND }
DIVISION, CLERK'S OFFICE, Ottawa, Oct. 6, 1869. }

MRS. MYRA BRADWELL--_Madam_: The court instruct me to inform you
that they are compelled to deny your application for a license to
practice as an attorney-at-law in the courts of this State, upon
the ground that you would not be bound by the obligations
necessary to be assumed where the relation of attorney and client
shall