absolute, for they can not enjoy the right of suffrage or
eligibility to office without such term of residence as
shall be prescribed by the constitution and laws of the
State into which they shall remove.

This case fully recognizes the right of suffrage as one of the
"privileges of the citizen," subject to the right of the State to
regulate as to the term of residence--the same principle was laid
down in the case of Corfield _vs._ Coryell in the Supreme Court
of the United States. Justice Washington, in delivering the
opinion of the court, used the following language:

"The privileges and immunities conceded by the Constitution
of the United States to citizens in the several States," are
to be confined to those which are in their nature
fundamental, and belong of right to the citizens of all free
governments. Such are the rights of protection of life and
liberty, and to acquire and enjoy property, and to pay no
higher impositions than other citizens, and to pass through
or reside in the State at pleasure, and to enjoy the
elective franchise as regulated and established by the laws
or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised.

And this is cited approvingly by Chancellor Kent. (2 Kent, sec.
72).

This case is cited by the majority of the Committee, as
sustaining their view of the law, but we are unable so to
understand it. It is for them an exceedingly unfortunate
citation.

In that case the court enumerated some of the "privileges of
citizens," such as are "in their nature fundamental and belong of
right to the citizens of all free governments" (mark the
language), and among those rights, place the "right of the
elective franchise" in the same category with those great rights
of life, liberty, and property. And yet the Committee cite this
case to show that this right is not a fundamental right of the
citizen! But it is added by the Court that the right of the
elective franchise "is to be enjoyed as regulated and established
by the State in which it is to be exercised." These words are
supposed to qualify the right, or rather take it out of the list
of fundamental rights, where the Court had just placed it. The
Court is made to say by thi