existing independent of State citizenship.

But it may be said, if the States had no power to abridge the
right of suffrage, why the necessity of prohibiting them? There
may not have been a necessity; it may have been done through
caution, and because the peculiar condition of the colored
citizens at that time rendered it necessary to place their rights
beyond doubt or cavil.

It is laid down as a rule of construction by Judge Story that the
natural import of a single clause is not to be narrowed so as to
exclude implied powers resulting from its character simply
because there is another clause which enumerates certain powers
which might otherwise be deemed implied powers within its scope,
for in such cases we are not to assume that the affirmative
specification excludes all other implications. (2 Story on
Constitution, sec. 449.)

There are numerous instances in the Constitution where a general
power is given to Congress, and afterward a particular power
given, which was included in the former; yet the general power is
not to be narrowed, because the particular power is given. On
this same principle the fact that by the XV. Amendment the States
are specifically forbidden to deny the right of suffrage on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, does
not narrow the general provision in the XIV. Amendment which
guarantees the privileges of all the citizens against abridgment
by the States on any account.

The rule of interpretation relied upon by the committee in their
construction of the XV. Amendment is, "that the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another," or the specification of
particulars is the exclusion of generals. Of these maxims, Judge
Story says:

They are susceptible of being applied, and often are
ingeniously applied, to the subversion of the text and the
objects of the instrument. The truth is, in order to
ascertain how far an affirmative or negative provision
excludes or implies others, we must look to the nature of
the provision, the subject-matter, the objects, and the
scope of the instrument; these and these only can properly
determine the rule of construction (2 Story, 448).

It is claimed by the committee that the second section of the