better with the
department of the legislator than of the moralist. As Mr. Stephen
forcibly shows, although the consideration of motive may fall very
seldom within the sphere of legislation, yet no theory which should
exclude its influence on the moral standard could be tolerated, since
the motive is of primary importance in our ethical judgment of
conduct. Nor has motive, as discriminated from intention, ever been
kept entirely outside the criminal law, notwithstanding the danger of
admitting, as an extenuation of some violent crime, that the offender
had convinced himself that some religious or patriotic cause would be
served by it. James Mill's view of morals as theoretically coordinate
with law--because in both departments the intention is the essential
element in measuring actions according to their consequences--operated
in practical contradiction to his principle of restraining State
interference within narrow limits. It is this latter principle which
has since given way. For the general trend of later political opinion
has evidently been towards bringing public morality more and more
under administrative regulation; and this manifestly indicates a
growing expansion of ideas upon the legitimate duties and jurisdiction
of the State.

Upon James Mill's psychology Mr. Stephen's conclusion, with which we
may agree, is that his analysis of virtue into enlightened
self-interest is unsuccessful, and we have seen that his conception of
government, as an all-powerful machine resting upon, yet strictly
limited by, public opinion, has failed on the side of the limitations.
Yet although Mill could not explain virtue, he was, after his fashion,
a virtuous man, whose life was conscientiously devoted to public
objects.

'His main purpose, too, was to lay down a rule of duty, almost
mathematically ascertainable, and not to be disturbed by any
sentimentalism, mysticism, or rhetorical foppery. If, in the
attempt to free his hearers from such elements, he ran the risk of
reducing morality to a lower level, and made it appear as unamiable
as sound morality can appear, it must be admitted that in this
respect, too, his theories reflected his personal character.'

It is also probable that his theories, and his bitter controversies in
defence of them, reacted on his personal character, and that both
influences are to be traced beyond James Mill's own life, in the
mental and social prepossessions w