e, behind its centre.

It was not long before Macwitty was hotly engaged; and the French,
who were coming along in skirmishing order, among the rocks and
broken ground, were soon brought to a standstill. For some time a
heavy fire was exchanged. Three times the French gathered for a
rush; but each time the steady volleys, from their almost invisible
foes, drove them back again, with loss, to the shelter they had
left.

In the intervals Terence could see how the fight was going on
across the valley. The whole hillside was dotted with fire, as the
French worked their way up, and the British troops on the crest
fired down upon them. Several times parties of the French gained
the brow, but only to be hurled back again by the troops held in
reserve, in readiness to move to any point where the enemy might
gain a footing. For forty minutes the battle continued; and then,
having lost 1500 men, the French retreated down the hill again,
covered by the fire of their batteries, which opened with fury on
the crest, as soon as they were seen to be descending the slope.

At the same time the light troops opposed to Terence also drew off.
Seeing the pertinacity with which the French had tried to turn his
left, Sir Arthur Wellesley moved his cavalry round to the head of
the valley and, obtaining Bassecour's division of Spanish from
Cuesta, sent them to take post on the hillside a short distance in
rear of Terence's Portuguese.

The previous evening's fighting had cost Victor 1000 men, while 800
British had been killed or wounded; and the want of success then,
and the attack on the following morning, tended to depress the
spirits of the French and to raise those of the British. It was
thought that after these two repulses Victor would not again give
battle, and indeed the French generals Jourdan and Sebastiani were
opposed to a renewal of hostilities; but Victor was in favour of a
general attack. So his opinion was finally adopted by the king, in
spite of the fact that he knew that Soult was in full march towards
the British rear, and had implored him not to fight a battle till
he had cut the British line of retreat; when, in any case, they
would be forced to retire at once.

The king was influenced more by his fear for the safety of Madrid
than by Victor's arguments. Wilson's force had been greatly
exaggerated by rumour. Venegas was known to be at last approaching
Toledo, and the king feared that one or both of these forces might