d the fortress of power for the six
years 1835-41. On this view it may be said that, if the Royal
intervention anticipated and averted decay from natural causes, then
with all its immediate success, it defeated its own real aim.

But this power of dismissing a Ministry at will, large as it may be
under given circumstances, is neither the safest nor the only power
which, in the ordinary course of things, falls Constitutionally to the
personal share of the wearer of the crown. He is entitled, on all
subjects coming before the Ministry, to knowledge and opportunities of
discussion, unlimited save by the iron necessities of business. Though
decisions must ultimately conform to the sense of those who are to be
responsible for them, yet their business is to inform and persuade the
Sovereign, not to overrule him. Were it possible for him, within the
limits of human time and strength, to enter actively into all public
transactions, he would be fully entitled to do so. What is actually
submitted is supposed to be the most fruitful and important part, the
cream of affairs. In the discussion of them, the Monarch has more than
one advantage over his advisers. He is permanent, they are fugitive; he
speaks from the vantage-ground of a station unapproachably higher; he
takes a calm and leisurely survey, while they are worried with the
preparatory stages, and their force is often impaired by the pressure of
countless detail. He may be, therefore, a weighty factor in all
deliberations of State. Every discovery of a blot, that the studies of
the Sovereign in the domain of business enable him to make, strengthens
his hands and enhances his authority. It is plain, then, that there is
abundant scope for mental activity to be at work under the gorgeous
robes of Royalty.

This power spontaneously takes the form of influence; and the amount of
it depends on a variety of circumstances; on talent, experience, tact,
weight of character, steady, untiring industry, and habitual presence at
the seat of government. In proportion as any of these might fail, the
real and legitimate influence of the Monarch over the course of affairs
would diminish; in proportion as they attain to fuller action, it would
increase. It is a moral, not a coercive, influence. It operates through
the will and reason of the Ministry, not over or against them. It would
be an evil and a perilous day for the Monarchy, were any prospective
possessor of the Crown to assume or cla