o make the attack upon the
Enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.

If the Enemy's Fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and
that the two lines and advanced squadron could fetch them, they will
probably be so extended that their van could not succour their rear. I
should therefore probably make the Second in Command's signal to lead
through about their twelfth ship from their rear; or wherever he could
fetch, if not able to get so far advanced. My line would lead through
about their centre: and the advanced squadron to cut three or four ships
ahead of their centre, so as to ensure getting at their Commander in
Chief, on whom every effort must be made to capture.

The whole impression of the British Fleet must be, to overpower from two
or three ships ahead of their Commander in Chief (supposed to be in the
centre) to the rear of their Fleet.

I will suppose twenty sail of the Enemy's line to be untouched: it must
be some time before they could perform a manoeuvre to bring their force
compact to attack any part of the British Fleet engaged, or to succour
their own ships; which indeed would be impossible, without mixing with
the ships engaged. The Enemy's Fleet is supposed to consist of forty-six
sail of the line; British, forty:[30] if either is less, only a
proportional number of Enemy's ships are to be cut off; British to be
one-fourth superior to the Enemy cut off.

Something must be left to chance: nothing is sure in a sea-fight, beyond
all others; shot will carry away masts and yards of friends as well as
foes: but I look with confidence to a victory before the van of the
Enemy could succour their rear; and then that the British Fleet would
most of them be ready to receive their twenty sail of the line, or to
pursue them should they endeavour to make off.

If the van of the Enemy tack, the captured ships must run to leeward of
the British Fleet: if the Enemy wear, the British must place themselves
between the Enemy and captured, and disabled British ships: and should
the Enemy close, I have no fear for the result.

The Second in Command will, in all possible things, direct the movements
of his line, by keeping them so compact as the nature of the
circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular line
as their rallying-point; but in case signals cannot be seen or clearly
understood, no Captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside
that of