little else than the extensive
teaching of its just forms, according to analogy and the general custom of
the most accurate writers. This teaching, however, may well embrace also,
or be combined with, an exposition of the various forms of false grammar by
which inaccurate writers have corrupted, if not the language itself, at
least their own style in it.

With respect to our present English, I know not whether any other
improvement of it ought to be attempted, than the avoiding and correcting
of those improprieties and unwarrantable anomalies by which carelessness,
ignorance, and affectation, are ever tending to debase it, and the careful
teaching of its true grammar, according to its real importance in
education. What further amendment is feasible, or is worthy to engage
attention, I will not pretend to say; nor do I claim to have been competent
to so much as was manifestly desirable within these limits. But what I
lacked in ability, I have endeavored to supply by diligence; and what I
could conveniently strengthen by better authority than my own, I have not
failed to support with all that was due, of names, guillemets, and
references.

Like every other grammarian, I stake my reputation as an author, upon "a
certain set of opinions," and a certain manner of exhibiting them,
appealing to the good sense of my readers for the correctness of both. All
contrary doctrines are unavoidably censured by him who attempts to sustain
his own; but, to grammatical censures, no more importance ought to be
attached than what belongs to grammar itself. He who cares not to be
accurate in the use of language, is inconsistent with himself, if he be
offended at verbal criticism; and he who is displeased at finding his
opinions rejected, is equally so, if he cannot prove them to be well
founded. It is only in cases susceptible of a rule, that any writer can be
judged deficient. I can censure no man for differing from me, till I can
show him a principle which he ought to follow. According to Lord Kames, the
standard of taste, both in arts and in manners, is "the common sense of
mankind," a principle founded in the universal conviction of a common
nature in our species. (See _Elements of Criticism_, Chap, xxv, Vol. ii, p.
364.) If this is so, the doctrine applies to grammar as fully as to any
thing about which criticism may concern itself.

But, to the discerning student or teacher, I owe an apology for the
abundant condescension with which