ous character, cause not the same feeling of approbation;
even though the source of our approbation be the same, and flow
from sympathy and an idea of their utility. There is something very
inexplicable in this variation of our feelings; but it is what we have
experience of with regard to all our passions and sentiments.

SECT. VI CONCLUSION OF THIS BOOK

Thus upon the whole I am hopeful, that nothing is wanting to an accurate
proof of this system of ethics. We are certain, that sympathy is a very
powerful principle in human nature. We are also certain, that it has a
great influence on our sense of beauty, when we regard external
objects, as well as when we judge of morals. We find, that it has force
sufficient to give us the strongest sentiments of approbation, when it
operates alone, without the concurrence of any other principle; as in
the cases of justice, allegiance, chastity, and good-manners. We may
observe, that all the circumstances requisite for its operation are
found in most of the virtues; which have, for the most part, a tendency
to the good of society, or to that of the person possessed of them. If
we compare all these circumstances, we shall not doubt, that sympathy is
the chief source of moral distinctions; especially when we reflect, that
no objection can be raised against this hypothesis in one case, which
will not extend to all cases. Justice is certainly approved of for no
other reason, than because it has a tendency to the public good: And the
public good is indifferent to us, except so far as sympathy interests
us in it. We may presume the like with regard to all the other virtues,
which have a like tendency to the public good. They must derive all
their merit from our sympathy with those, who reap any advantage from
them: As the virtues, which have a tendency to the good of the person
possessed of them, derive their merit from our sympathy with him.

Most people will readily allow, that the useful qualities of the mind
are virtuous, because of their utility. This way of thinking is so
natural, and occurs on so many occasions, that few will make any scruple
of admitting it. Now this being once admitted, the force of sympathy
must necessarily be acknowledged. Virtue is considered as means to an
end. Means to an end are only valued so far as the end is valued.
But the happiness of strangers affects us by sympathy alone. To that
principle, therefore, we are to ascribe the sentiment of approb