eral
scheme or system of action, which is advantageous. When I relieve
persons in distress, my natural humanity is my motive; and so far as
my succour extends, so far have I promoted the happiness of my
fellow-creatures. But if we examine all the questions, that come before
any tribunal of justice, we shall find, that, considering each case
apart, it would as often be an instance of humanity to decide contrary
to the laws of justice as conformable them. Judges take from a poor
man to give to a rich; they bestow on the dissolute the labour of the
industrious; and put into the hands of the vicious the means of harming
both themselves and others. The whole scheme, however, of law and
justice is advantageous to the society; and it was with a view to this
advantage, that men, by their voluntary conventions, established it.
After it is once established by these conventions, it is naturally
attended with a strong sentiment of morals; which can proceed from
nothing but our sympathy with the interests of society. We need no other
explication of that esteem, which attends such of the natural virtues,
as have a tendency to the public good. I must farther add, that there
are several circumstances, which render this hypothesis much more
probable with regard to the natural than the artificial virtues. It is
certain that the imagination is more affected by what is particular,
than by what is general; and that the sentiments are always moved
with difficulty, where their objects are, in any degree, loose and
undetermined: Now every particular act of justice is not beneficial to
society, but the whole scheme or system: And it may not, perhaps, be any
individual person for whom we are concerned, who receives benefit from
justice, but the whole society alike. On the contrary, every particular
act of generosity, or relief of the industrious and indigent, is
beneficial; and is beneficial to a particular person, who is not
undeserving of it. It is more natural, therefore, to think, that the
tendencies of the latter virtue will affect our sentiments, and command
our approbation, than those of the former; and therefore, since we find,
that the approbation of the former arises from their tendencies, we may
ascribe, with better reason, the same cause to the approbation of the
latter. In any number of similar effects, if a cause can be discovered
for one, we ought to extend that cause to all the other effects, which
can be accounted for by it: But