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e hope
of aid. The Florentines on the other hand, thinking success dependent
principally upon celerity, assembled ten thousand foot and two thousand
horse, who, under the command of Federigo, lord of Urbino, marched into
the country of Volterra and quickly took entire possession of it. They
then encamped before the city, which, being in a lofty situation, and
precipitous on all sides, could only be approached by a narrow pass
near the church of St. Alessandro. The Volterrani had engaged for
their defense about one thousand mercenaries, who, perceiving the great
superiority of the Florentines, found the place untenable, and were
tardy in their defensive operations, but indefatigable in the constant
injuries they committed upon the people of the place. Thus these poor
citizens were harassed by the enemy without, and by their own soldiery
within; so, despairing of their safety, they began to think of a
capitulation; and, being unable to obtain better terms, submitted to the
discretion of the Florentine commissaries, who ordered the gates to
be opened, and introduced the greater part of their forces. They then
proceeded to the palace, and commanded the priors to retire to their
homes; and, on the way thither, one of them was in derision stripped
by the soldiers. From this beginning (so much more easily are men
predisposed to evil than to good) originated the pillage and destruction
of the city; which for a whole day suffered the greatest horrors,
neither women nor sacred places being spared; and the soldiery, those
engaged for its defense as well as its assailants, plundered all that
came within their reach. The news of this victory was received with
great joy at Florence, and as the expedition had been undertaken wholly
by the advice of Lorenzo, he acquired great reputation. Upon which one
of the intimate friends of Tommaso Soderini, reminding him of the advice
he had given, asked him what he thought of the taking of Volterra; to
which he replied, "To me the place seems rather lost than won; for had
it been received on equitable terms, advantage and security would have
been the result; but having to retain it by force it will in critical
junctures, occasion weakness and anxiety, and in times of peace, injury
and expense."
[*] A lean peace is better than a fat victory.
CHAPTER VI
Origin of the animosity between Sixtus IV. and Lorenzo de' Medici--Carlo
di Braccio da Perugia attacks the Siennese--Carlo retires
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