ing to put it off. To give the
Venetians greater assurance of his sincerity, he made a truce with the
Milanese for a month, withdrew from Milan and divided his forces among
the places he had taken. This course was the occasion of his victory and
the ruin of the Milanese; for the Venetians, confident of peace, were
slow in preparing for war, and the Milanese finding the truce concluded,
the enemy withdrawn, and the Venetians their friends, felt assured that
the count had determined to abandon his design. This idea injured them
in two ways: one, by neglecting to provide for their defense; the next,
that, being seed-time, they sowed a large quantity of grain in the
country which the enemy had evacuated, and thus brought famine upon
themselves. On the other hand, all that was injurious to his enemies
favored the count, and the time gave him opportunity to take breath and
provide himself with assistance.

The Florentines during the war of Lombardy had not declared in favor of
either party, or assisted the count either in defense of the Milanese or
since; for he never having been in need had not pressingly requested
it; and they only sent assistance to the Venetians after the rout at
Caravaggio, in pursuance of the treaty. Count Francesco, standing now
alone, and not knowing to whom else he could apply, was compelled to
request immediate aid of the Florentines, publicly from the state, and
privately from friends, particularly from Cosmo de' Medici, with whom he
had always maintained a steady friendship, and by whom he had constantly
been faithfully advised and liberally supported. Nor did Cosmo abandon
him in his extreme necessity, but supplied him generously from his own
resources, and encouraged him to prosecute his design. He also wished
the city publicly to assist him, but there were difficulties in the way.
Neri di Gino Capponi, one of the most powerful citizens of Florence,
thought it not to the advantage of the city, that the count should
obtain Milan; and was of opinion that it would be more to the safety
of Italy for him to ratify the peace than pursue the war. In the first
place, he apprehended that the Milanese, through their anger against the
count, would surrender themselves entirely to the Venetians, which would
occasion the ruin of all. Supposing he should occupy Milan, it appeared
to him that so great military superiority, combined with such an extent
of territory, would be dangerous to themselves, and that if