ngratitude of their
old and habitual friends. Having foreseen the necessity into which the
Venetians must come, they had informed the count that their ruin must
involve his own; that he was deceived if he thought the duke, while
fortune, would esteem him more than if he were in adversity; that the
duke was induced to promise him his daughter by the fear he entertained
of him; that what necessity occasions to be promised, it also causes to
be performed; and it was therefore desirable to keep the duke in that
necessity, which could be done without supporting the power of the
Venetians. Therefore he might perceive, that if the Venetians were
compelled to abandon their inland territories, he would not only lose
the advantages derivable from them, but also those to be obtained from
such as feared them; and that if he considered well the powers of
Italy, he would see that some were poor, and others hostile; that the
Florentines alone were not, as he had often said, sufficient for his
support; so that on every account it was best to keep the Venetians
powerful by land. These arguments, conjoined with the hatred which the
count had conceived against Filippo, by supposing himself duped with
regard to the promised alliance, induced him to consent to a new treaty;
but still he would not consent to cross the Po. The agreement was
concluded in February, 1438; the Venetians agreeing to pay two-thirds of
the expense of the war, the Florentines one-third, and each engaging to
defend the states which the count possessed in La Marca. Nor were these
the only forces of the league, for the lord of Faenza, the sons of
Pandolfo Malatesti da Rimino and Pietro Giampagolo Orsini also joined
them. They endeavored, by very liberal offers, to gain over the marquis
of Mantua, but could not prevail against the friendship and stipend of
the duke; and the lord of Faenza, after having entered into compact with
the league, being tempted by more advantageous terms, went over to him.
This made them despair of being able to effect an early settlement of
the troubles of Romagna.

The affairs of Lombardy were in this condition: Brescia was so closely
besieged by the duke's forces, that constant apprehensions were
entertained of her being compelled by famine to a surrender; while
Verona was so pressed, that a similar fate was expected to await her,
and if one of these cities were lost, all the other preparations for the
war might be considered useless, and the