tona, Leghorn, and Monte Pulciano; and would have
accomplished more if the citizens had lived in unity, and had not
revived former factions; as in the following book will be particularly
shown.

BOOK IV

CHAPTER I

License and Slavery peculiar defects in republican
governments--Application of this reflection to the state of
Florence--Giovanni di Bicci di' Medici re-establishes the authority of
his family--Filippo Visconti, duke of Milan, endeavors to make amicable
arrangements with the Florentines--Their jealousy of him--Precautionary
measures against him--War declared--The Florentines are routed by the
ducal forces.

Republican governments, more especially those imperfectly organized,
frequently change their rulers and the form of their institutions; not
by the influence of liberty or subjection, as many suppose, but by
that of slavery and license; for with the nobility or the people, the
ministers respectively of slavery or licentiousness, only the name of
liberty is in any estimation, neither of them choosing to be subject
either to magistrates or laws. When, however, a good, wise, and powerful
citizen appears (which is but seldom), who establishes ordinances
capable of appeasing or restraining these contending dispositions, so as
to prevent them from doing mischief, then the government may be called
free, and its institutions firm and secure; for having good laws for its
basis, and good regulations for carrying them into effect, it needs
not, like others, the virtue of one man for its maintenance. With such
excellent laws and institutions, many of those ancient republics, which
were of long duration, were endowed. But these advantages are, and
always have been, denied to those which frequently change from tyranny
to license, or the reverse; because, from the powerful enemies which
each condition creates itself, they neither have, nor can possess any
stability; for tyranny cannot please the good, and license is offensive
to the wise: the former may easily be productive of mischief, while the
latter can scarcely be beneficial; in the former, the insolent have too
much authority, and in the latter, the foolish; so that each requires
for their welfare the virtue and the good fortune of some individual who
may be removed by death, or become unserviceable by misfortune.

Hence, it appears, that the government which commenced in Florence at
the death of Giorgio Scali, in 1381, was first sustained by the tal