run counter to every sound strategical
principle, had he attacked without necessity an army numerically so
superior. For that the Swedish force amounted in all to not more than
18,000 men there is as much proof almost as it is possible to attain in
such a matter.

A rough calculation would make Wallenstein and Pappenheim's whole united
force not more than 27,000, unless any reenforcements took place which
have not been recorded, or which have escaped my notice. If we estimate
Pappenheim's division at 10,000, this will give 17,000 Imperialists on
the field before he joined again on the day of the battle. But the
_Swedish Intelligencer_, whose information was derived from English
officers about the person of Gustavus, conceives that Wallenstein must
have had at this time full 20,000, or, as he afterward modifies his
opinion, that he must have had 30,000 in all, of whom 10,000 or 12,000
were with Pappenheim.

According to these estimates, then, we may conclude that there were in
the Imperial camp at Luetzen, on November 5th, from 15,000 to 18,000, or
perhaps even 20,000, men. Such numbers offered to Gustavus, especially
under the circumstances, a strong temptation to attack them; and, the
Imperial army being so divided, he had a reasonable hope--a hope by
which he was justified in forcing the engagement--that he should be able
to defeat successively both divisions. Even as it was, Pappenheim's foot
not arriving soon enough to support contributed in no small degree to
the loss of the battle.

The field, which was intersected by a canal that unites the Saale and
the Elster, called the Flossgraben, was almost a level; but of all the
accidents afforded by such ground Wallenstein had taken advantage.
Luetzen lay to his right a little in front. Between it and three
windmills close to his right wing intervened some mud-walled gardens.
These he made use of as forts, throwing into them little garrisons, and
loopholing the walls. The mill hills he converted into batteries, and
the dry ditches by the roadside into breastworks for his musketeers.

The fog having cleared off for a season, at ten o'clock the battle
began. The wind and sun were in the King's favor; but Wallenstein had
the advantage in weight of artillery and position. Gustavus did not long
sustain the cannonade of the enemy before he gave the order to charge
toward the highway and dislodge the musketeers who occupied the ditches
on the side of it. This being effected