im of all action in War is to disarm
the enemy, and we shall now show that this, theoretically at least, is
indispensable.

If our opponent is to be made to comply with our will, we must place him
in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice which
we demand; but the disadvantages of this position must naturally not
be of a transitory nature, at least in appearance, otherwise the enemy,
instead of yielding, will hold out, in the prospect of a change for
the better. Every change in this position which is produced by a
continuation of the War should therefore be a change for the worse. The
worst condition in which a belligerent can be placed is that of being
completely disarmed. If, therefore, the enemy is to be reduced to
submission by an act of War, he must either be positively disarmed or
placed in such a position that he is threatened with it. From this it
follows that the disarming or overthrow of the enemy, whichever we call
it, must always be the aim of Warfare. Now War is always the shock of
two hostile bodies in collision, not the action of a living power upon
an inanimate mass, because an absolute state of endurance would not be
making War; therefore, what we have just said as to the aim of action in
War applies to both parties. Here, then, is another case of reciprocal
action. As long as the enemy is not defeated, he may defeat me; then I
shall be no longer my own master; he will dictate the law to me as I
did to him. This is the second reciprocal action, and leads to a second
extreme (SECOND RECIPROCAL ACTION).

5. UTMOST EXERTION OF POWERS.

If we desire to defeat the enemy, we must proportion our efforts to his
powers of resistance. This is expressed by the product of two factors
which cannot be separated, namely, the sum of available means and the
strength of the Will. The sum of the available means may be estimated in
a measure, as it depends (although not entirely) upon numbers; but the
strength of volition is more difficult to determine, and can only be
estimated to a certain extent by the strength of the motives. Granted we
have obtained in this way an approximation to the strength of the power
to be contended with, we can then take of our own means, and either
increase them so as to obtain a preponderance, or, in case we have not
the resources to effect this, then do our best by increasing our means
as far as possible. But the adversary does the same; therefore, there is
a new mu