the weight of this small remaining residue.

We have spoken here of bodily effort, chiefly because, like danger,
it belongs to the fundamental causes of friction, and because its
indefinite quantity makes it like an elastic body, the friction of which
is well known to be difficult to calculate.

To check the abuse of these considerations, of such a survey of things
which aggravate the difficulties of War, nature has given our judgment a
guide in our sensibilities, just as an individual cannot with advantage
refer to his personal deficiencies if he is insulted and ill-treated,
but may well do so if he has successfully repelled the affront, or has
fully revenged it, so no Commander or Army will lessen the impression
of a disgraceful defeat by depicting the danger, the distress, the
exertions, things which would immensely enhance the glory of a victory.
Thus our feeling, which after all is only a higher kind of judgment,
forbids us to do what seems an act of justice to which our judgment
would be inclined.

CHAPTER VI. INFORMATION IN WAR

By the word "information" we denote all the knowledge which we have of
the enemy and his country; therefore, in fact, the foundation of all our
ideas and actions. Let us just consider the nature of this foundation,
its want of trustworthiness, its changefulness, and we shall soon feel
what a dangerous edifice War is, how easily it may fall to pieces and
bury us in its ruins. For although it is a maxim in all books that
we should trust only certain information, that we must be always
suspicious, that is only a miserable book comfort, belonging to that
description of knowledge in which writers of systems and compendiums
take refuge for want of anything better to say.

Great part of the information obtained in War is contradictory, a still
greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of a doubtful
character. What is required of an officer is a certain power of
discrimination, which only knowledge of men and things and good judgment
can give. The law of probability must be his guide. This is not a
trifling difficulty even in respect of the first plans, which can
be formed in the chamber outside the real sphere of War, but it is
enormously increased when in the thick of War itself one report follows
hard upon the heels of another; it is then fortunate if these reports in
contradicting each other show a certain balance of probability, and thus
themselves call forth a scrutin